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Foreign relations arise because each nation in the world, as
'·

it comes into contact with others, has its hopes, its interests, its
fears.

If

Each expresses these national drives in its foreign policy,

the policy is effective, it advances the hopes and interests of a nation,
not at the expense of others, but by the process of reconciliation and
accommodation.

In so doing, it mitigates the fears on all sides.

In

so doing, it acts for peace,
To put it briefly, an effective foreign policy is one which
serves national needs in a complex world, a world of many nations and
many needs, by methods other than those of the jungle.
How do we gra.sp the essence of these matters?
vey an understanding of them to others?

How do we con-

These are questions which have

preoccupied me for some time, particularly in anticipation of this meeting with you who are specialists in the process of understanding the
complex and helping others to learn to understand it,
It seems to me that we do not begin to appreciate the dimensions

of the problems of foreign

relations~

if we employ as yardsticks such

familiar terms as isolationism or internationalism.
of the past and they do not help us in the present,

These are ambiguities

As far as isolation-

ism is concerned, I think that, as a nation, we have long since recognized
the impracticability of a policy designed to insulate ourselves or even
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the Western Hemisphere from the massive currents which flow through the
world and the storms which beset it.

The military conflicts, three in

the lifetime of some of us, have dispelled the illusion of isolation.
As a more recent reminder, if any is needed, I call to your attention
the Eoviet test rocket which dropped into the Pacific some weeks ago.
It landed about an hour after it had left a launching pad a.lmost 8, 000

miles away.
I do not think it is necessary to labor the point. It is
clear

~hat,

for better or for worse, we are in and of this world or,

in these days of space exploration, perhaps I should say in and of this
universe.

It is obvious that it will be for worse rather than better

if we close our eyes to thco.t fact or try to pull the cover over our

heads to shut out that fact.
I do not say that the urge to isolationism, this urge to escape
from reality is gone entirely from the nation.

It is there to some de-

gree but it is no longer the principal source of our difficulties in
foreign relations.

The present problems come more, I believe, from a

rather widespread belief that all which is classifiable as internationalism
has, per se, a special claim to virtue.
The fact is there are no panaceas in an indiscriminate embrace
of internationalism anymore than there is escape in isolationism.
is the point I wish to stress most strongly.

That

Let me illustrate it by a

- 4 story which, since you are teachers, may shock you but a story whose
meaning will not be lost on you.

As teachers we know, I think, better

than most, o£ the immense value to our relations with other nations, of
improving our abilities in foreign languages.

In recent years, the

teaching profession has given great emphasis to the study of languages
and the government has taken steps to encourage it.
sira.ble development.

That is a most de-

What we may overlook in our present enthusiasm for

this great tool, however, is that it is only a tool.
proof guarantee of effective foreign relations.

It is not a fool-

The story with which I

wish to illustrate the point is that of an American diplomat in Latin
America some years ago.

He made public statements which did a great deal

of damage to our relations with that part of the world.

Yet he spoke

these statements in perfect f.panish of whicn he was a master.
Americans were astounded by his knowledge of Spanish.

The Latin

They were even

more astounded and, in addition, were infuriated by what he said in
f:panish.

Obviously, here was a case where our relations might well have

profited from someone with rather less capability of communicating in
that language.
As it is with languages, so it is with policies of internationalism in general.

It by no means follows that if five American

military bases abroad are helpful, ten will be doubly helpful.

It by

no means follows that an aid-program which costs $5 billion a year will
be 5 times more useful than a program which costs $1 billion.

It by no
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means follows that if 20 American representatives are doing an effective
job in a country in Asia, 200 representatives will increase the effectiveness by a factor of 10. It by no means follows that each additional
agency added to the United Nations system will increase the total contribution which that useful system makes to peace.

In short, in any category

of action, not excluding international action, it is possible not only to
go beyond the point of diminishing returns but even to the point of increasing loss.
What I am suggesting, then, is that we need to divest ourselves
of the notion that all policies, all acts automatically are to be sanctioned if they are classifiable under the general heading of internationalism ,.

There can be illusions no less misleading, no less dangerous to the

hopes and interests of the nation in this generalization than those which
appeared at an earlier time in the guise of isolationism,
The basic problem of maintaining effective foreign relations
and of building peace, insofar as we can contribute to it, lies not so
much in more policies or more machinery but in giving fresh direction to
existing policies and in refining the machinery by which these policies
are now pursued.
the world as it is.

It we would meet this problem we need, first, to see

We need to see it as it is now, before we can

reasonably hope to see it as we should like it to be.

We need to see

our present policies as they are, rather than as we imagine them to be,
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No illusion in our present understanding of the world is more
misleading than that which assumes that there has been peace since a
truce Wc.s signed in Korea in 1953.

To equate the present situation in

that country or, indeed in most parts of the world with peace, may well
be to equate it with the period of 1940 in Europe, the period of the socalled "Phony War" just prior to the German drive into the Lowlands and
France or with the state of Japanese-American relations on the eve of
Pearl Harbor.
If it is enough to define peace as the immediate absence of

gun-fire then I suppose the present world-situation, on the whole, may
be so regarded.

But if peace means to you what it means to me, a

reasonable assurance that the young people whose education is now in
your charge shall have an opportunity through that education to develop
their potentialities and to grow into constructive maturity without the
ever -present

prc~:~p.;ct

of sudden and immense devastation being visited

upon them, then the present situation cannot be defined as peace.
have a long way to go to peace.

We

To create the illusion that we have

already arrived at it is to do a grave disservice to the nation.

That, may

I say, is one of the principal dc:.ngers of goodwill tours and meetings at
the summit, whatever advantages they may offer.
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We shall not achieve peace by studying the applause meters or
the comparative Hooper ratings of Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Eisenhower
in India or France or wherever else they may visit.

The road to peace

does not lie in the winning of international popularity contests.

Rather, it

lies in the reduction of the fears which push nations and systems of nations
towards military clash.

It lies in a frank recognition of conflicting

national interests and ideological hopes and, if they cannot be reconciled
at this time, in turning them away from the channels which lead to the
nuclear destruction of a recognizable civilization in the world.
If we scan the principal regions of the world we shall be able

to discern quickly that there is no peace in this sense, but, instead, a
series of points of potential conflict.

In the Far East, these points are

to be found in Korea, in the Formosan Straits and in Indo-China.
of these areas, a truce written or unwritten prevails.

In each

The Truce conceals

but it does not heal the ideological and political divisions which plague
the Korean people, the Chinese people, and the people of Viet Nam and
Laos.

In the case of Korea, the 38th parallel is still guarded 24 hours a

day on both sides.

In the Formosan Straits, Chinese communist guns

fire from the mainland at the outpost islands of the nationalists- -at Quemoy
and Matsu--every other day.

In Indo-China--in Laos--there was a narrow

escape from a large -scale conflict just a few months ago and the situation
remains unstable.

In Viet Nama rigid division separates the communist

north from the free south and shows no signs of closing in peace.
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In short, throughout the Far East, there exists, in excess, one

of the most common precipitants of war- -unnatural political divisions of
peoples who are in reaHty deeply united by culture, by geography and by
history.

I shall not review the circumstances which brought about the

divisions.

All of them, to be sure, are overlaid with the ideological

schism 'between cornmunism and freedom.
own loce>.l characteristics.

But each division, too, has its

It is to these characteristics no less than

to the broader ideological question which we must look if there is ever
to be a full understanding of the situations and, h e :ace, a chance for them
to evolve in the direction of a stable peace.

That refinement of the problem

in policy has yet to begin.
Until it begins, a basis does not exist upon which to proceed
towards peace.

Any suggestion that our policies have actually produced

peace in these areas is gravely misleading.

It obscures the problems

which sooner or later, may well engulf in conflict not only those peoples
immediately involved but the world and ourselves as a part of it.
What our policies have done so far is to buy time in the Far East.
We have spent billions through the deployment of our own armed forces
in that region and through aid -programs to hold the line against a communist
advance.

Thousands of American and other lives were sacrificed to the

same end in Korea.
in the Far East.

But I repeat: all we have done so far is to buy time

-9If we look elsewhere in Asia, to China, we find still another

common cause of conflict.

We find a nation recently revived from a long

slumber which had been induced by an inner decay and by outer pressures
upon it, now being revived under the forced draft of a militant totalitarianiRm.

This revived China tests its new found strength in an aggres-

sive and brutal probing into territories of its neighbors.

The China of

today is a China which is vastly different - -so far as we can judge, for
our information is all second-hand- -from the China to which we were allied
during World War II.

It is a China in which tens of millions of young

people are coming of age with no direct knowledge of Americans but with
an induced hatred of this country and its institutions.
Let no one underestimate the long-range effect of these years
of animosity between ourselves and China.

It is, to say the least,

illusory to talk of peace while the animosity is pre sent in virulent form.
It is illusory to talk of peace with a China on the march, not in the paths

of progress by accommodation with other nations but in the ancient way
of Empire under a canopy of modern totalitarian trappings.

I do not say

that this development- -this emergence of a new and bristling China- -in
the heart of Asia must lead inevitably to war.

I do say that I see little

in it or in our policies with respect to it which warrants the assumption
that we are at peace.
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Moving westward to the Middle East, here, too, we find a situation which by no stretch of the imagination can be identified as peace.
Rather, it is a situation of suspended war.

On repeated occasions in

the past, the suspension has all but ended in grave border clashes.

On

two occasions, at the time of the Suez crisis and in connection with the
Lebanon crisis, the world dangled with one foot over the brink of disaster.
Our political intervention at the United Nations in connection with the
Suez crisis may have forestalled a total collapse in the Middle East.
Our military intervention in Lebanon may have had the same effect.

But

communist penetration of that area--economic and political--has not been
curbed nor has a basis for peace been estal::lished.
The Eisenhower doctrine on the Middle East was intended to help
achieve both objectives.

So, too, have the enormous sums of public funds

which have been spent on various kinds of aid to that area.

Yet both have

proved remarkably ineffective.
It is conceivable that we may have helped to hold back the floodwaters of conflict in that region by our acts of intervention and by our
aid, but we have done little if anything to disperse or to rechannel them
constructively.

And behind the barriers which our policies have tried to

build, the flood-waters are accumulating in a dangerous fashion.

Each

outbreak in the Middle East appears less controllable than its predecessor.
In these circumstances it is, to say the least, illusory to talk of peace.

- 11 If ther e is grav e instability in the Middle East, the same is

true for Africa.

New forces are at work in that continent which we are

just beginning to recognize in policy, let alone understand.
For decades Africa was preponderently a region acted upon rather
than a region which acted in international relations.

Since the end of

World War II, however, 7 new nations have come into being in Africa.
This year, an additional 5 are scheduled to achieve independence and more
will fol!ow in du e course.

This enormous and rapid political change

alone is sufficient to bring about massive problems of readjustment.

But

H is not only a political upheaval which rumbles through that great continent.

Other forces common t o all the underdeveloped nations, from

Eastern Asia to Latin America, are felt no less strongly in Africa.

The

urge is there, for human equality and for a continuing and rapid modernization, with its promise of economic and social benefit to all peoples.
The urge is there, but the means to satisfy it adequately in peace have
yet to be devised either by the .A.irica nations themselves or in concert
with others .
Again, Africa is in danger of being more acted upon rather
than acting itself in international affairs as it finds itself increasingly
the focal point of rival ideologies and systems.

This competition

for African favor may be flattering to the Africans for the moment but
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it contains accumulating dangers to them and to peace.

The dangers will

be curbed only as Africa, increasingly, finds its own way in the world,
larg3ly by its own genius and efforts.

I venture to say that if the

continent is not sidetracked by the blandishments from outside during
this transition, if it does not become careless with the strong new wine
of national independence, it will in due course make an enormous and
unique contribution to the progress of mankind and to peace.
I should note in this connection that with the political transition
in Africa, the composition of the United Nations General Assembly is
changing in a fashion which assures a decisive voice to the Afro-Asian
nations.

As you know, it is in the General Assembly that expression is

given to world-wide aspirations.

We can hope that the Afro-Asian nations

and this nation will more and more see the problems of peace and freedom
in similar perspective and that their voice will be raised in harmony
with our own.

That is, however, by no means a certainty.

If much depends

on the manner in which the African nations develop and use their newly
achieved freedom, much also depends on the wisdom and the sensitivity
of the policies of the older free nations towards the changes which are
taking place in the emergent African continent.
Much closer to home are the problems of peace in Latin America.
Notwithstanding the President 1s recent goodwill tour we are still faced
with the need for harmonization of Latin American interests with our own.
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Beneath the facade of Hemispheric unity there are deep divisions and much
dissatisfaction particularly in economic matters.

Fortunately, the

present state of our relations with Cuba is not typical of our Latin
American relations.

But, then, neither was the very warm welcome extended

to President Eisenhower in any way typical.

As a man of goodwill, Mr.

Eisenhower invariably evokes a response of goodwill.

A firm basis for

sound relations, however, is not conjured up out of ceremonial journeys
of leas than two-vveeks duration.

Such journeys may open doors but the

problem of keeping them open is one of

follo,.·;-t~rough

in policies.

It seems to me that the need now in inter-American relations is

a broad movement forward to new and higher grounds of hemispheric understanding and cooperation.

We need this development in inter-American

education and cultural ezchange no less than in defer..se.
economic matters no less than in political

~uestions .

We need it in

And if our great

neighbor to t!1e North, Canada, is so inclined, we should welcome its
participation in any and all matters of Hemispheric interest.

Unless

this movement forward begins soon and in earnest, I am afraid we may
anticipate in this hemisphere whose solidarity is an essential of peace,
at worl3t, more sharp clashes in the present Cuban pattern and at best,
a steady erosion of hemispheric intimacy which will increasingly drain
inter-American ideals of their substance.
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Turning next to Europe, we find there, toe, an illusion of
peace which masks deep and dangerous divisions.

That is particularly

the case in Germany but it is also true of the entire continent which
is split assunder by the ideologicaL cleavage.

Across the chasm only

rickety bridges of contact are maintained.
If there is a need for progress towards unity in the divided

cou:1tries of Asia, there is a compelling need for progress towards unification in Germany and for a growing reconciliation between Eastern and
Western Europe.
Until recently, at least, our policies on Europe had remained
unchanged in essentials for a decade.

We have been engaged in a vast

holding action in the fear that the Russians might attack Western Europe,
a fear which was inter-mingled with the hope that sooner or later the
Russians would withdraw from Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe.
To that end, we spent billions to rearm VI estern Europe and to maintain
our forces in that region.

The Russians, similarly, have engaged in a

vast holding action--an action in the expectation that Western European
freedom would fall prey to communism and an action to hold on to a
dominance in Eastern Europe which they had obtained in consequence of
World War II. To that end they have kept military forces in the Eastern
European nations and rearmed those nations and, until the advent of Mr.
Khrushchev, minimized contacts between East and West.

15

It is increasingly clear that these policies have not led to
the achievement of the aims of the one side or the other.

The communist

grip shows no signs of weakening in Eastern Europe and freedom has
come back with great vitality in Western Europe.
Certainly, the policies r..ow pursued have not led to peace.

They

have been, on both sides, holding actions which have produced, at best,
an unotable truce based upon a Germany split inside the larger split of
Europe.

That the truce is highly unstable was indicated by the first

German crisis last year.

This crisis arose out of the mere announce-

ment that the Russians intended to change one factor in the situation;
that is, to withdraw from Berlin and the routes of access to the city in
favor of the East German communists.

It is ironic that a Russian

announcemement of a withdrawal, of all things, should produce a crisis;
yet it did so, for the move threatened to upset the present delicate
balance which depends, with equal irony, on the continued Russian
presence in Eastern Germany.
In the round of goodwill tours and conferences, the Russians were
persuaded to remain a while longer in Berlin and Germany and the crisis
eased.

The source of crisis, however, remains in the outdated policies

of both sides in Europe.

In short, the tours and conferences have

served as safety valves but I need hardly emphasize the danger of relying
indefinitely on safety valves.

Sooner or later, it will be necessary to

come to grips in a practical fashion with the problems of a divided
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Germany and a divided Europe.

The visiting back and forth, notwith-

standing, the promise of peace will be illusory until the divisions in
Germany and Europe begin to close in peace on the basis of policies
attuned to today 1s realities rather than yesterday 1s expectations.
In the same fashion, the problem of control of armaments-armaments of massive destruction in particular- -must begin to yield to
tangible solution before we can talk of peace in any meaningful fashion.
We have watched the mathematical progression in the development of the
megaton-power of these weapons since the end of World War II.

The

Russians, the British. no less than ourselves, have advanced from a
capability of destroying cities to a capability of destroying nations, to a
capability of destroying civilization.

The number of nations able to

produce such weapons has increased from 1 in 1945 to 4 in 1960 and is
subject to further increase if other countries who have the capacity decide
so to deploy their science, technology and energy.

The missiles of

delivery have improved, from the crude but destructive V -Bombs which
carried devastation to London in the closing days of World War II to those
which encircle the moon and the sun in 1960.
All the while the wisest humans among us, the most compassionate
humans among us have warned the world of what it is about in this deadly
race for greater and more certain means of human annihilation.

All the
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while, there have been disarmament conferences in which these words of the
wise have been echoed with a remarkable unanimity by all nations.

Yet a

decade and a half has passed and we have yet to achieve a single agreement,
signed and sealed, for the control of armaments.

I do not wish to minimize

the difficulties involved in this process but surely there is something
amiss, something illusory when all endorse the warnings of wisdom, when
all agree on the extent of the danger to all and yet agreement is not
ach5.eved which makes possible even the beginnings of a beginning of substance on this critical problem.
In 1955, I suggested that a summit conference be held on the
one question of ending the testing of nuclear weapons.
we may be on the verge of such a conference.

Five years later,

If it can now produce this

one achievement it will mark a major, if long -delayed, step forward,
Important as it would be, however, this achievement will be but the
start of a long road.

Until there exists a firm pattern for the progressive

extension of international control over armaments we will do well not to
speak of peace as prevailing in the world.

This pattern, moreover, is

not likely to be established until the political differences and divisions
which I have been discus sing begin also to yield to practical and progressive solution.

In this connection, I may be wrong and I hope I am wrong

but I see little likelihood that the current session of the disarmament
conference in Geneva, anymore than its innumerable predecessors, will
lead to any agreement of substance,

- 18 If I may summarize, then, let me say that the United States
has made, in the past decade, a vast international effort,

That effort

has helped to keep open the prospect for peace but it has not yet begun
to produce conditions of peace in any significant degree,
instance is this more evident than in foreign aid.

In no single

We have made available

for such purposes, funds approaching $100 billion since the end of World
War II.

Tr.e great bulk of this aid has gone to restore the ciamages of

war or to hold by military means existing situations against deterioration.
The positive aspect of aid as it is currently expressed in the Point: Four
Program of technical cooperation and in loans for modern development has
a relative!y small part cf the total aid-program ever since the Marshall
Plan came to a s-uccessful termination,

In the current year, for example,

the President has requested $4.1 billion for foreign aid,

Of this total,

however, only $200 million is for Point 4 aid and $700 million for development loans.

By contrast $2 billion is for military aid and $700 million for

military-related defense support .
In short, we will do well to recognize still another illusion
in our policies; namely, that the vast amounts of aid now being spent is
of a kind which necessarily builds conciitions of peace.

By far the larger

share, as I noted, serves primarily to hold existing situations as they
are and only a relatively small proportion goes into the constructive effort which is essential in Asia, Africa and Latin America if we are to
have a reliable peace.
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Many members of Congress who r e cognize the importance of foreign
aid in the conduct of our foreign relations have been pressing for years
to bring about r eforms and refinements in this program.

We have sought

and we will seek again to consolidate fully the functions of the aidagency with those of the Department of State.

We have sought and we will

seek again to give o.dded emphasis to economic aid as contrasted with military aid.

W e have sought and we will seek again t o substitute as far as

possibl e long-term loans on easy terms fer large grants of aj.d.

We have

sought a nd we will seek again to protect and advance the Point Four concept, that is, the people -to-people type of technical assistance.

We have

sought and we will seek again to bring about an united aid-effort which
draws increasingly on the cooperation of We stern Europe and Japan, whose
recent progress has been such as to enable t hem to assume a much larger
share of the initiative and the cost of assisting the less-favored nations.
Discr i minating changes in any major governmental undertaking such
as foreign aid are hard to bring about by action from Congress.

We can

alter legislation as we have done, or pass new legislation, but in the
last analysis, effective change depends even more on the administration
which has the responsibility for giving effect to the law.

In this connec-

tion, I would call to your attention the fact that on two separate occasions
in the past Congress voted to abolish the aid-agency and turn its functions
over to the Department of 8tate and the Department of Defense.

And two

times this action was reversed by the Administration which, on each occasion, reconstituted the aid-agency under a different name.

Despite such
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setbacks, some progress has been made in streamlining and improving the
administration of the aid-program but much still remains to be done.
The aid-program is, in many ways, typical of our foreign policies
as a whole.

The problem of bringing about effective foreign relations lies

not so much in new policies and new machinery as it does in sharpening
existing policies and refining existing machinery.

The absence of clear-

cut, attainable object:ve s and the mo,ribund administration of the aid-program
--as a recent fenate study of the program in Viet Nam made clear--are principal weaknesses in foreign aid ,

~o,

in our foreign policy as a whole.

I have no desire to minimize the tasks

too, are these factors of weakness

of the President and Secretary of ftate in these matters.
exacting respons1bility.

Theirs is an

Nevertheless, it seems to me that there is a

great need to iook beyond and to act beyond the expensive holding action
in which we are now engaged throughout the world.

We need to see anew

the facts of the divisions in Asia no less than those in Europe.

We need

to think anew the costly and ineffective effort merely to keep the situation as it is in the Middle East.

We need to recog nize fully the defects

of the aid-effort in Asia, no less than in an emergent Africa and in
Latin America.

We need to sharpen the policies by which we deal with

these problems, in the hope that the problems may begin to yield to practical solution.

In short, we need a new determination and a new approach to

foreign relations which will move the nation forward from this costly,
lackadaisical and dangerous illusion of peace towards the reality of peace.

